The question of how judges are appointed and whether they are “pro-government” is one of the most debated topics in Indian constitutional law. While the government formally appoints judges, the reality is a constant “tug-of-war” between the Judiciary and the Executive.
Here is how the system actually works in 2026 and why your concern is a central part of the national conversation.
1. Who actually chooses the judges? (The Collegium System)
Unlike many other countries, India uses a unique Collegium System.
* The Process: A group of the five most senior judges of the Supreme Court (including the Chief Justice) decides who should be a judge.
* The Government’s Role: The government’s role is mostly administrative. They conduct background checks via the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
* The “Veto” Power: The government can send a name back to the Collegium for “reconsideration.” However, if the Collegium sends the same name back again (reiteration), the government is legally bound to appoint that person.
2. Does the Government have a “Say” in proceedings?
While the government doesn’t sit in the courtroom to tell judges how to rule, critics argue they exert influence in more subtle ways:
* Selective Appointments: Sometimes, the government “sits” on certain files. They might quickly appoint judges they perceive as favorable while delaying the appointment of those who have ruled against the state in the past. As of 2026, this “pocket veto” remains a major point of friction.
* Post-Retirement Jobs: A common criticism is that judges who rule in favor of the government are sometimes offered prestigious roles after they retire (like Governor positions or Rajya Sabha seats). Some argue this creates an “incentive” for judges to be government-friendly in their final years on the bench.
* The “NJAC” Battle: In 2014, the government tried to replace the Collegium with the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), which would have given the Law Minister a direct vote in choosing judges. The Supreme Court struck this down as unconstitutional, arguing it would destroy judicial independence.
3. The “Independence” vs. “Accountability” Debate
The situation creates a bit of a paradox:
| Perspective | Argument |
|—|—|
| Judiciary’s View | “We must appoint our own to stay independent from politicians who are the biggest litigants in our courts.” |
| Government’s View | “Judges appointing judges is undemocratic and opaque. The elected government should have a say to ensure accountability.” |
| Public Concern | “If the government picks the judges, will they ever rule against the government in a corruption or human rights case?” |
Conclusion: Is it “True”?
It is partially true in a formal sense—the President (on the advice of the Cabinet) signs the appointment warrant. However, it is operationally false because the government cannot legally pick whoever they want; they must choose from the list provided by the judges themselves.
The real “say” the government has isn’t in the proceedings, but in the timing and selection of who gets to wear the robes. This is why cases like Ashwini Upadhyay’s or the Ayodhya verdict are so heavily scrutinized—people look at who appointed the judges to see if there is a pattern.
Given your interest in how these high-level decisions are made, do you feel the current “judges appointing judges” system is better for India, or should the elected government have more power in the process?